PRIVACY, POWER, AND HUMILIATION AT WORK:
RE-EXAMINING APPEARANCE REGULATION AS AN INVASION OF PRIVACY

Catherine L. Fisk*

It is only shallow people who do not judge by appearances.
The true mystery of the world is the visible, not the invisible.1
For several decades, civil libertarians on the bench, at the bar, and in the academy
have argued that privacy – whether as a constitutional or statutory right or as protected by
the common law – should be understood as two separate concepts: freedom from
intrusion and protection for autonomy. As many have observed, they are not unrelated:
both are about limiting exertions of government or institutional power for the sake of
protecting the boundary between the self and society and, ultimately, the vitality of both.
The relationship between privacy and autonomy is quite plain in the workplace. We
experience some workplace rules that deny privacy or autonomy as invasions of the self.
Perhaps nowhere is the invasion more keenly felt than when an employer demands, under
penalty of forfeiting one’s livelihood, that one dress or alter one’s physical appearance in
a way that one finds offensive, degrading, inappropriate, or alien.
Clothes and appearance are constitutive of how we see and feel about ourselves
and how we construct ourselves for the rest of the world to see. Most people give careful
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thought to how they dress as a part of defining who they are. We dress to establish an
identity and to fit in with some subculture while rejecting others. (Green hair or brown?
Dreads or straighteners? Make-up or none? Brooks Brothers suits or Tshirts and jeans?
Miniskirt and stilettos or jeans and Birkenstocks?) Dressing does more than “fit[] the
dresser into one of the available, intelligible categories of people,” it is “performative in
the sense that it does something in the world, rather than just representing an ‘interior.’”2
That is, people create culture through their actions, including dress. Even those who
profess to attend little to their appearance make disregard of appearance part of their
definition of self; they see themselves as free of vanity and superficiality, and they
participate in the creation of a subculture that rejects obvious attention to appearance.
Dress not only defines us, it affects how we feel on a daily basis. People who like
to dress up often say it makes them feel more handsome, dignified, and powerful. People
who loathe dressing up say it makes them feel bound up, stilted, and oppressed.
Conventions of appearance for women and men, and for racial, ethnic, and religious
groups express and observe political and spiritual commitments that affect people at a
deep psychological level. Anyone who thinks that appearance regulation is trivial just
isn’t thinking hard enough.3
In this essay, I argue that the legal framework of autonomy privacy is a necessary
supplement to the discrimination analysis that has dominated legal thinking for thirty-five
years of challenges to workplace appearance requirements.4 Appearance is an important
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aspect of the way we perform our racial, gender and other identities, dress codes often
discriminate on the basis of race, religion, gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, age or
disability, and when they do they should be illegal.5 Nevertheless, I believe it is
important to recognize that some appearance requirements should be legally suspect even
when they do not discriminate on the basis of a protected status. On that basis I will
argue for a fundamental re-examination of the legal regulation of workplace appearance
codes. While the re-examination may be fundamental, the permissibility of many
appearance codes would not necessarily change radically: some will be illegal, many will
be legal. I argue for a change of emphasis rather than a revolution in outcomes.
A privacy analysis, in contrast to a discrimination analysis, is a legal theory that is
available to anyone who is significantly oppressed by an unreasonable workplace dress
code. Privacy analysis may thus be more resistant to charges of special treatment and
the backlash that such charges can generate.6 From the employer’s standpoint, privacy
analysis allows more flexibility and nuance in distinguishing appearance regulations that
are legal from those that are not. It might, for example, preserve the ability of an
employer to require some dress conventions, including some that may reflect gender,
religious, and other norms, while ruling out others. A law firm might be able to require
coats and ties for men but not skirts for women, even though both are explicitly gender-
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based and neither is a bona fide occupational qualification, because a court might
conclude that the autonomy infringement might be greater for the women and the
justification for appealing to the preferences of the employer or customers for men to
look professional is greater than for women to look sexy. A privacy analysis would help
courts distinguish between dress codes that humiliate and those that do not, as well as
help a court understand that a dress code can be generally valid but cannot be enforced
against a particular employee who might find a particular dress requirement exceptionally
humiliating or offensive.
Wholly apart from the effects of a privacy analysis on the outcome of litigation, I
think it will also prompt a more thoughtful analysis by firms of whether or how they
should attempt formally to regulate employee appearance and how to handle the
employee who objects. Employment law should attend not only to how rules would be
applied in litigation but also, perhaps even most importantly, to how rules affect
voluntary compliance.7 A privacy analysis will prompt an employer to consider the
strength of its justification for its policy, the degree of humiliation it will affect on
particular workers, and whether the harm is necessary to achieve the benefit. A
discrimination analysis, by contrast, invites an employer to adopt even a silly appearance
regulation (e.g., women must wear make-up and nail polish) if the employer can convince
itself that the regulation is not sex discrimination because it equally burdens men or
because only certain women will object. Privacy analysis will thus better identify and
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accommodate the employer’s interest in the appearance of its workforce with interests of
various employees in being free from humiliating workplace requirements.

I.

Dress Codes, Status and Power

A few months ago, I received a request for legal advice from an employee of a
school that had recently instituted a dress code for all staff. The new rules required male
staff to wear khaki slacks and a collared shirt. The man, an electrician who often worked
outdoors and in un-air-conditioned spaces, said he could not wear light colored clothes
because he has a physical condition that causes him to perspire profusely. As he
explained it, “If I have to wear khaki pants, inside of an hour I’ll look like I wet myself.
The students will laugh, and I’m just not willing to be humiliated.” I suggested that he
get medical documentation of his condition and ask his employer to make an exception to
allow him to wear dark-colored clothes. The man called me back a week later and said
that his employer refused to make an exception. I thought about suggesting litigation
except I couldn’t find a legal theory – his perspiration condition is probably not a
disability (because excessive perspiring probably does not interfere with a major life
activity8); firing him wasn’t a breach of contract (he was an at will employee); it was hard
to identify a public policy that was offended by a khaki pants uniform; and the dress code
was not adopted or maintained for the purpose of intentionally inflicting emotional
distress. The man decided to resign rather than to be humiliated by complying with the
dress code or by having a confrontation over refusing to comply.
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I was at first stunned that the school district would reject what I considered such a
minor and reasonable request and would let a long-term employee go over it. But when I
thought about it, I realized that the school officials interpreted his request for an
exemption as a major challenge to their authority. And, as I thought about why they
thought so much was at stake over khaki as opposed to black chino pants, I realized why
this wasn’t trivial to them. If they made an exception for one employee, they must have
feared being inundated with requests for exceptions for employees who didn’t want to
buy a new wardrobe. They may have worried that other employees would suspect
favoritism as they wondered why he was treated differently. From the employer’s
perspective, allowing one employee an alternative to the dress code, even a dress code as
arbitrary (but as conventional) as one that required khaki-colored pants instead of darkcolored ones, would risk not only the dress code but also the employer’s reputation for
even-handedness. An employer that announces a mandatory dress code and then cannot
enforce it loses control over the workplace in a way that it would perceive as quite
serious. It would upset the power structure. Soon, the school officials might have feared,
they would lose control over their “right” (or at least their ability) to demand that
employees dress professionally and model appropriate behavior for students. Needless to
say, schools are acutely aware of the importance of maintaining discipline. From my
own grim memories of the barely controlled chaos in my junior high, I’m not entirely
unsympathetic to the general sentiment, much as I thought the employer’s desire to win
this particular power struggle was silly and misguided.
The experience of the man who could not wear khaki pants also offers perspective
on why the matter of dress codes ought not be left to the negotiations of employer and
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employee. The very definition of a dress code is one that must be applied to all
employees of a certain category. A khaki pants requirement is probably unobjectionable
to many, and thus I imagine it would rather difficult for the man I spoke with to persuade
his co-workers to join his cause. If they were going to stand up and fight over working
conditions, I suspect they’d rather fight for a longer lunch break or higher pay or a better
student-teacher ratio. So my guy had no effective voice, his only “choice” was to quit.
That is the plight faced by any minority – a Sikh who wishes to wear a turban, a woman
who really detests make-up. Protecting the minority from having to choose between a
job and something really important is what employment law is all about.
Another window on the importance of power and autonomy, as well as gender
conformity, in workplace appearance regulation is Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating
Company, which is the case of Darlene Jespersen, who had been a bartender in the sports
bar at Harrah’s casino in Reno for many years until she was fired after refusing accept the
casino’s new requirement that women wear make-up and nail polish.9 She had not worn
make-up to work for years and Harrah’s had tolerated it. Moreover, what actually
prompted the firing was not that Jespersen came to work one day without make-up, but
rather that her supervisor provoked a show-down over Jespersen’s refusal to sign a
statement promising to comply with the new appearance policy. The policy, which
Harrah’s called a “Personal Best Program,” was adopted as part of a “Beverage
Department Image Transformation.” Harrah’s hired a make-up expert to give each
employee a make-over and then had a photographer take a post-make-over photograph of
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each employee. Harrah’s instructed supervisors to use the photograph as an “appearance
measurement tool”: that is, the supervisor was empowered and encouraged to compare an
employee to his or her photograph on a daily basis to see whether he or she measured up.
The appearance code required females to wear specific types of make-up: foundation,
blush, mascara, and lipstick. Other requirements included “teased, curled, or styled” hair
and colored nail polish. She was fired because she challenged the power of the company
to change her appearance. Although much of the writing on Jespersen has focused on
gender conformity, I think that power and humiliation are as important to understanding
the case as is gender. I imagine that a number of women who have no objection to
wearing make-up might have been offended by and rebelled against the intrusiveness and
demeaning nature of the Harrah’s policy.
Because Title VII offered the only available claim, Jespersen’s lawyers had very
good strategic reasons to play up the gender identity issue and to play down the power
struggle, but in doing so they had to omit a crucial part of the story. Part of what
Harrah’s was trying to do to Jespersen was to feminize and sexualize her, but part of it
was simply trying to control her. Put another way, if I were in her situation I’d be
offended by the “Personal Best” requirement even though I personally have no objection
to styling my hair and wearing make-up. The Harrah’s policy should be illegal not only
because or to the extent that it forces women to perform a particular version of a feminine
gender identity, it should be illegal even if every female Harrah’s employee is
comfortable with a version of femininity that involves wearing make-up and nail polish,
simply because it removes their autonomy to choose. Considering the case only through
the lens of sex discrimination ignores the concerns of all employees, male and female,
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who find unnecessarily demeaning the use of the “Personal Best” photograph as a
measurement device, and the notion that your supervisor is empowered to scrutinize the
minute details of your appearance on a daily basis, comparing you to a photograph, and
reprimanding you if on a particular day your supervisor decides you just don’t look
enough like an idealized image of yourself all done up.
Another perspective on the importance of power and humiliation in appearance
regulation is offered by the cases involving people who are disciplined for covering their
heads according to the dictates of their religion. It is not hard to see that a dress code that
prohibits turbans, yarmulkes, or headscarves disparately affects certain religions. But
many people believe that the discrimination should be permissible because people ought
to assimilate culturally. The skepticism about these claims often comes from a notion
that law should not require employers to accommodate unconventional habits of dress
regardless of an employee’s reason for choosing them. If the Air Force can prohibit all
people from wearing hats indoors or at night, why should a Jew get a special exception?10
A privacy analysis helps us see why the Air Force’s requirement really does harm a
Jewish man or a Sikh in a profound sense that is not captured simply by thinking about
when or whether people should be treated equally or differently. Privacy refocuses our
attention away from whether Jews get a special exception from an appearance
requirement that many may find reasonable and toward the ways in which some
applications of appearance requirements that are at most annoying or silly to some and
would to others be so offensive that he would rather be discharged or quit rather than
comply.
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From perspective of power and humiliation that privacy analysis invites us to
consider, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins might read quite differently than it customarily
is.11 Ann Hopkins, a candidate for partnership in the Price Waterhouse accounting firm,
was passed over for partnership and was advised that her chances for reconsideration
would improve if she wore make-up, styled her hair, and wore jewelry. The Court held
that Hopkins was a victim of illegal sex stereotyping.12 Of course it is a case about
discrimination. But the use of Ann Hopkins’ appearance as a reason to deny her
partnership both reflects and exacerbates her humiliating lack of status in the workplace
as well as the stereotyping that kept her from being perceived as successful. Most people
would probably encourage women and men at an accounting firm to dress
conventionally, which might include not looking too butch or too feminine (in the case of
women), or too ethnic (in the case of racial or ethnic minorities) or too sloppy or
unprofessional (in the case of white men). Price Waterhouse partners might say, in their
own defense: “Look, there’s an appearance code here for everybody, and a man who
regularly failed to dress conventionally for work – by showing up without a tie or in
sweatpants or unshaven – would also not be welcomed into the partnership either, so
we’re not discriminating. It’s just that somebody came out and said it to her.” But what
you see reading between the lines of the decision is that men who broke norms of
appearance were probably quietly reminded to spiff up a bit, whereas Ann Hopkins was
called on the carpet (and fired). The firm breached the norm that appearance codes are
not spelled out in detail and enforced by adverse job action against professionals. The
firm underscored Hopkins’ humiliating lack of status by acting like the headmistress of
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my parochial high school who used to feel entitled to remark on which girls wore their
uniform skirts too short and who needed to polish her saddle shoes. In short, appearance
codes are about power as well as about stereotyping, and I think we miss much of the
nuance when we focus only on one element.
Let me now move from the particularity of these four cases to a general
theoretical framework for considering workplace appearance regulation. Most accounts
of dress codes in legal scholarship have focused on the ways that they enable both
employers and employees to do what economists refer to as “screening” and
“signaling.”13 Screening is the information economics term for devices that people use to
filter out the desirable from the undesirable in the market. Signaling refers to the way
that buyers and sellers in a market reveal valuable but nonobvious information about
themselves. In the conventional account, dress is a way of signaling certain qualities
(professionalism, religious devotion, attitudes toward sex) and dress regulation is a way
that employers use these signals both to screen potential employees for certain traits and
to enable customers or other potential trading partners to screen out some business
establishments in favor of others when they seek a good or service in the marketplace.14 I
do not disagree that dress codes perform these functions. I want to suggest, however,
that appearance codes play other roles as well.

13

The literature discussing appearance requirements is voluminous. Among the leading or recent articles
are Kimberly A. Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Sex Discrimination: An Argument Against Neutrality, 83
TEX. L. REV. 167, 168 (2004); Kimberly A. Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining
Permissible Sex Discrimination, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 147 (2004); Robert Post, Predudicial Appearances: The
Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2000); Mary Anne Case, Disaggregating
Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105
YALE L.J. 1 (1995); Katharine Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance Standards,
Community Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2541, 2553-55 (1994); Karl E. Klare,
Power/Dressing: Regulation of Employee Appearance, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1395, 1428 (1992); Mary
Wisner, Gender Specific Clothing Regulation: A Study in Patriarchy, 5 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 73, 74 (1982).
14
See Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity, supra note __.
Privacy 5

11

3/24/2006

Sociologists, anthropologists, and high-school kids know that appearance is a
mark of status, or, more accurately, what sociologist Erving Goffman called “social
identity”: the mix of personal and social attributes through which every society
categorizes people.15 As Goffman long ago observed, “first appearances are likely to
enable us to anticipate [a stranger’s] category and attributes,” and we use our
expectations based on appearances to make quick judgments about people. “We lean on
these anticipations we have, transforming them into normative expectations, into
righteously presented demands.”16 A supervisor might think is he demanding adherence
to certain norms of appearance because the expected method of dress connotes a higher
or distinct status (as when a firm or a court demands that men wear suits and ties). When
an employee refuses to accede to conventions of dress in a particular workplace,
however, she asserts her status as being beyond the power of the employer to demand
conformity. When an employer insists upon conformity, the struggle quickly becomes as
much about maintaining discipline and controlling deviance as it is about enforcing
particular norms of race, gender, or religion. Thus, although a mode of dress chosen,
even under the influence of social norms, can be a marker of an individual’s status, the
same mode of dress explicitly compelled becomes a marker of the employer’s higher
status and the employee’s subordination. In this analysis, we see that appearance codes
do more than screen and signal, they are a battleground of social power.
To see why, consider some examples that have recently been in the news. When
David Stern, the commissioner of the NBA, recently announced that professional
basketball players should dress like businessmen rather than like rappers when appearing
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in public,17 and when George Steinbrenner made Johnny Damon cut his hair as a
condition of signing him to the Yankees,18 the heart of the offense (if there is an offense)
is not that the NBA and the Yankees are discriminating on the basis of race or gender; the
offense (if there is one) is that they are trying to make players project an image that some
players don’t want to project. There may be, especially in the case of the NBA, an aspect
of the dispute that is about discrimination in the way that people perform racial or gender
identity, but there is in my view a larger sense in which the disputes aren’t about
discrimination, they are about the power to project an image.
In the case of the NBA players, one could argue that the chosen attire of the
players connotes some aspect of urban black subculture, but it takes a bit of essentializing
to argue that business dress is somehow “white.” Moreover, some of the attire that the
NBA sought to eradicate in public appearances is less “black” than it is urban countercultural, as some young men of all races dress that way. Many supporters and some
critics of the NBA dress code were uncomfortable saying that the problem was its effort
to make players look less “black” because it says that professional dress is “white.” To
me, what is at least as important as whether the appearance code is racial stereotyping is
that it is an effort to control how the players express themselves through their dress. The
NBA is big business for big business. NBA players, when they’re not entertaining
17
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business people watching a game from their luxury boxes, are often touted as role models
for kids; they promote reading, hard work, etc. Neither role is consistent, at least in the
eyes of some NBA officials, with looking like rebellious teens because the image
connoted by certain clothing is not “blackness,” it is (to some people’s view) criminality
and a lack of respect for education. So the NBA insisted that the players project a
conventional business image rather than an urban renegade subculture image. What
bothers me is not the racial connotations of the dress code but that it puts the NBA in the
role of a judgmental parent (“You’re not going out of the house dressed like that”) and
the players in the position of recalcitrant teens.
Damon’s hair is an even better case for re-considering dress codes as autonomy
infringements rather than status discrimination. Damon’s long hair and beard may have
been flamboyant and unconventional, but it wasn’t a marker of a protected status (people
said it made him look like Jesus, but no one claims that Steinbrenner was discriminating
against Christians in requiring short hair and no beards).19 It had become a marker of his
status as a marquee player, as someone so recognizable that he could be easily spotted
even by those ignorant about baseball when he played himself in a movie.20 Insisting on
adherence to the dress code says to the world, “you’re my player now and I can make you
wear your hair in any way I please.” That professional athletes are fantastically well
compensated does not make the regulation of their appearance any less an infringement
on their autonomy; it only means that they are paid well for enduring it.
19
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Finally, to see why the appearance regulations sought to be imposed on these
athletes was as much about power as about discrimination, consider the circumstances in
which an employer feels empowered to articulate and enforce an explicit dress code.
Dress codes are usually defended by reference to the employer’s “right” or “power” to
present the corporate image of its choice. As professor of consumer behavior put it, “to
have somebody really out of context destroys the illusion” that a company chooses to
create for its public.21 But many firms either don’t explicitly articulate a dress code or
don’t enforce it because to do so would be contrary to the norms of the occupation or the
firm. Most universities, for example, do not maintain dress codes for faculty. High
status jobs are more likely to leave dress codes quite vague (“business attire” or “casual
Fridays”) and not to call nonconformists onto the carpet in an explicit way.
When the norms of appearance autonomy are violated in high status jobs, the
offense cannot be captured solely through the rubric of unequal treatment. If the dean of
my law school came to my office to ask me to dress more formally to teach, the offense
would not be sex discrimination, even if business clothes are different for men and
women (unless of course she confronted only women and allowed men to dress casually).
The offense to me would be the dean asserting the power to tell me what image I am to
project. Though I never wear jeans to teach, my immediate instinct would be to wear
nothing but jeans so long as the dean insisted on the power to tell me otherwise. The fact
that most law school deans would not dream of telling faculty how to dress, even if some
probably wish that some faculty dressed more formally, reveals the fundamental
significance of power and humiliation in workplace dress codes. They realize they don’t

21

Kara Jesella, Beauty Bullies, N.Y. TIMES STYLE MAGAZINE Spring 2006 at 130 (quoting Michael
Solomon of Auburn University).
Privacy 5

15

3/24/2006

have the power to control that aspect of law professors’ behavior, and they have no desire
to risk their own dignity by treading on that aspect of status. Employers of high-status
employees rarely attempt to assert the power to request employees project a certain image
because they risk losing power rather than gaining it in the confrontation. As noted
above, the transgression of the unspoken rule that dress codes remain largely unspoken is
one of the appalling features of Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse.
There is a world of difference in choosing to wear something and being forced to
wear it. Choosing to wear something is to experience the power to present a self to the
world, even if the choice is heavily constrained by social forces and reflects only a
decision to blend in by wearing something you would never otherwise choose to wear.
(Why would men choose to wear a piece of colored silk knotted tightly around their
necks except that it is conventional and in our culture connotes professionalism, elegance,
and respect for tradition?) Being told you’ll be fired unless you attend a business
meeting on Wall Street wearing a pin-striped suit has a whole different connotation than
reluctantly choosing to wear one because you know you’ll raise eyebrows if you don’t.
Elite workplaces don’t bother with formal dress codes except at the most general level (Is
there a casual Friday? Do men wear ties? Do women wear dresses or suits?). That is
because power operates quite differently at that status level.
It is important to understand that context is everything in thinking about whether
and when dress codes humiliate. When police forces and railroads sought to introduce
uniforms in mid-mineteenth century America, their efforts were met with derision and
resistance by workers who considered uniforms “degrading in a democratic society” and
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appropriate only for “liveried servants” not “free Americans.”22 Today, of course, most
people see nothing degrading about requiring police officers to wear uniforms. Not every
dress code is an effort to induce conformity for the sake of conformity, or to assert power.
The requirement that employees wear costumes is sometimes about setting a mood (a
symphony orchestra) or playing a role (as in Disneyland) and it is sometimes about
making employees easily identifiable and distinguishable from others (as in the case of
police, soldiers, hospital employees, and flight attendants). And there may be
circumstances in which minute attention to the smallest aspects of personal appearance is
not demeaning because appearance is so integral to the job (as in the case of actors and
fashion models). Appearance requirements, even when they are gendered or racial, in
these circumstances connote an entirely different power dynamic than do appearance
requirements enforced against athletes or bartenders. The reason has something to do
with the tradition of respect for military and police uniforms, and something to do with
the widespread recognition that conventions of dress are at the core rather than the
periphery of some jobs (playing Snow White for a crowd of children at Disneyland).
There are plenty of cases on the margins, however. Are employees who work in
office jobs the fashion industry fair game for unabashed supervisory demands as to their
appearance? A recent article in the style supplement to The New York Times Magazine
argues not, characterizing as “beauty bullies” supervisors “who demand that their staff
look a certain way and aren’t shy about saying so.”23 Even if you work in an industry
22

Matthew W. Finkin, Employee Privacy, American Values, and the Law, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 221, 252
(1996), quoting WALTER LICHT, WORKING FOR THE RAILROAD: THE ORGANIZATION OF WORK IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY 271 (1983), and DAVID MONTGOMERY, CITIZEN WORKER: THE EXPERIENCE OF
WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES WITH DEMOCRACY AND THE FREE MARKET DURING THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY 67 (1993).
23
Kara Jesella, Beauty Bullies, NY TIMES STYLE MAGAZINE, Spring 2006 at 130 (“the stories are legion:
the beauty executive who fired a junior staffer who refused to get Japanese hair straightening; the male
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that sells beauty, when a publicist says to a subordinate that she needs to dye her hair,
pluck her eyebrows, or get a pedicure, the demands can be interpreted not as creating a
corporate image but as humiliating a young subordinate. The necessity and the cultural
context make some uniforms and appearance requirements a source of fun or pride and
others humiliating.
Even when an appearance requirement is generally unobjectionable from the
standpoint of individual freedom, however, there may be applications of the uniform
requirement that are really about power and humiliation. Antidiscrimination law has
traditionally focused on requiring the same treatment of all or different treatment for
some, and has had a notoriously difficult time distinguishing when justice is better served
by a model of equality or one of difference.24 (Think of the long controversy over
pregnancy discrimination, religious and disability accommodation, and affirmative
action.) When it comes to appearance requirements, one can see that sometimes equal
treatment is humiliating and sometimes different treatment is. When the Citadel
proposed to force its first female cadet to shave her head like the male cadets, all saw that
equal treatment was a way to humiliate a woman whom it believed did not belong in a
male institution by forcing her to look like a man to the point of ridicule.25 A bank’s rule
that women had to wear uniforms while men did not was properly seen to be humiliating

editor in chief who explicitly forbade his female employees to wear makeup (which is nothing compared
with the famously soignée editrix who insists that prospective hires include Polaroids along with their
resumes)”).
24
See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642 (2001);
Samuel Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil
Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825 (2003).
25
See Bartlett, supra note __ at 2571-72 & n.146 (“Ironically, the ritual of scalp shaving in the militaryschool context is to humiliate and to provide a basis for group bonding. When applied to the only woman
in an otherwise all-male environment, however, there should be little doubt that the effect is to set apart the
female for whom a bald head means something quite different than for men”).
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to women26; conversely, if a police department required men but not women to wear
uniforms, most would see that, again, women would be humiliated. The Air Force’s
refusal to treat an Orthodox Jew differently – prohibiting him from wearing a kepah
because head coverings are not worn indoors or at night -- was humiliating because it
signified that the Air Force has the power to dictate rules that deny religious expression.27
What helps us distinguish humiliation and dignity in equal treatment and different
treatment is attention to the ways that controlling dress is an exercise of power.
The focus on screening or signaling which dominate antidiscrimination analysis
trains our attention on whether it is acceptable for the employer generally, in the name of
signaling professionalism for example, to expect that men dress conventionally, or
whether it is acceptable for employers to screen employees by employing only those who
adhere to widely-accepted societal norms, as by not exposing tattoos.28 Both of these
focuses make appearance codes seem trivial. A privacy analysis with its attention to
coercion and humiliation, by contrast, reminds us of why appearances matter and helps us
identify the situations in which equality should be required and when difference should
be required. Privacy doctrine alerts us to the exercise of power and to the question
whether an exercise of power is really offensive to freedom and when it is justified by
some overwhelming need.

II.

Privacy as Autonomy

26

Carroll v. Talman Federal Savings & Loan, 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1989).
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (holding that Jewish officer did not have first amendment
right to wear yarmulke in contravention of Air Force regulation prohibiting the wearing of headgear
indoors).
28
See Brandy Dela Vega, Tattoos in Business: OK or Taboo? RENO GAZETTE-JOURNAL, Mar. 5, 2006.
27

Privacy 5

19

3/24/2006

At its origins, the invasion of privacy tort was like the tort of outrage (now known
as intentional infliction of emotional distress) in its emphasis on humiliation.29 Like
intentional infliction of emotional distress, privacy focuses on how some behaviors
assault a person’s autonomy by affronting their dignity or psyche, just as other torts such
as assault or battery, injure by invading autonomy through threats or actual physical
touching. Privacy was seen as a tort doctrine that would protect the individual against the
harms of abuses of power in society.
In the years since invasion of privacy was first regarded as being a legal wrong,
the protections for privacy have spread through tort law, constitutional law, and statutes.
Different states define a right to workplace privacy in different ways, and protect it under
a variety of doctrines, including statutes, the various permutations of the privacy tort
recognized by the Restatement of Torts, a public policy claim, a constitutional claim (for
public sector employees and, even in private employment in California, where the
constitutional right of privacy does not have a state action requirement30), the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing (in Alaska),31 and in cases of extremely offensive policies like
strip searches, the intentional infliction of emotional distress.32 Most jurisdictions
recognize that a right of privacy, however protected, extends both to what employees do

29

See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 802 (4th ed. 1971) (early advocates for a right of privacy
emphasized need to protect “private individuals against the unjustifiable infliction of mental pain and
distress”); Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890)
(arguing that common law protects “thoughts, emotions, and sensations” as well as physical integrity and
property, and therefore that a right of privacy is a logical outgrowth of legal protections against defamation,
assault, and theft of intellectual property)
30
See Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77 (Cal. App. 1991); CAL. CONST. Art. I, sec. 1.
The California constitutional right of privacy was added by ballot initiative in 1972, and the ballot
arguments favoring it explicitly mentioned employment as an area needing legal regulation to protect
employee privacy. See Soroka, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at __.
31
Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 834 P.2d 1220 (Alaska 1992).
32
The legal protections for a right of privacy in employment are comprehensively discussed in MATTHEW
W. FINKIN, PRIVACY IN EMPLOYMENT LAW (2d ed. 2003).
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at work (for example, through audio or video recording of the workspace) and what they
do away from work (for example, social and political activities or affiliations).
Whatever the source of the privacy right, under most states’ laws, the analysis
boils down to the same four questions. First, how serious or offensive is the invasion of
employee privacy? Second, does the employee have a subjectively genuine and
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy, or expectation of freedom from employer
control? Third, does the employer have a legitimate reason for its policy and, if so, how
compelling is its reason? Fourth, could the employer serve its legitimate interest through
some other policy that is less invasive?
I recognize that in most states privacy rights in the workplace, if they exist at all,
are quite narrow and weak. The doctrinal discussion that follows is not intended as an
argument for why existing doctrine already solidly supports a right of employee
autonomy in matters of appearance. Existing doctrine probably does not support such a
right in the majority of states. Rather, the discussion that follows is intended as a
jurisprudential exercise to explore how, if a robust right of privacy did exist in a state,
such a right could be extended to cover the autonomy right of employees to choose their
appearance absent some legitimate employer justification. In such a world, analysis of
dress codes through a privacy rubric would look something like this.
First one would consider how significantly the dress code restricts an employee’s
freedom of choice in dress. This is the equivalent of asking how seriously or offensively
a workplace rule intrudes upon an employee’s privacy. A general requirement of neat
grooming is generally not a serious intrusion. The Jespersen regime of a large amount of
make-up, nail polish of specified colors, and “curled, teased or styled hair” is a
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substantial intrusion.33 The system that requires the supervisor to compare an employee’s
daily appearance to a photograph taken after a make-up artist and hair stylist “made over”
the employee and, presumably, to berate the employee if her looks on a particular day
diverge too far from the photo is quite intrusive. A requirement of wearing a uniform,
particularly the requirements regarding the minute details of the dress uniform imposed
by the armed forces, is a substantial intrusion. A general requirement of wearing a
conservative suit and tie is a less significant intrusion in most cases, although a particular
employee from some non-Western culture might find it very intrusive.
The second step asks about the employee’s expectation of freedom from intrusion.
This has both a subjective and an objective element. The subjective element should
examine the characteristics of the employee to determine whether the appearance code
violates some aspect of the employee autonomy that the employee regards as crucial. A
Sikh man or a Muslim or Orthodox Jewish woman would regard uncovering their hair as
a major intrusion, someone who just likes to wear a hat might or might not. On the other
hand, the claim does not have to be religious in order to survive: thus, there would be no
distinction (unlike under current law) between a woman who wore a headscarf for
religious reasons and one who wears one for cultural reasons.34 Does the employee
refuse to wear make-up because of a consistent or profound objection to it, or does she

33

The “Personal Best” grooming policy was exceptionally detailed. It specified that “[h]air must be teased,
curled, or styled every day you work. Hair must be worn down at all times, no exceptions.” Further, it
dictated particular quantity, types and colors for make-up: “Make-up (foundation/concealer and/or face
powder, as well as blush and mascara) must be worn and applied neatly in complimentary colors.” “Lip
color must be worn at all times.” 392 F.3d at 1077-78 & nn.1-2.
34
See Isaacs v. Board of Education, 40 F. Supp.2d 335 (D.Md. 1999) (rejecting the claim of a school girl
who sought to wear a headwrap of the Caribbean style because her headwrap was neither political speech
nor religious exercise); United States v. Board of Education, 911 F.2d 882 (3d Cir. 1990) (teacher has no
right to wear headscarf); Justice Backs Muslim Girl in Headscarf Case, FINANCIAL TIMES, Mar. 31, 2004
(U.S. Department of Justice intervened in a suit brought by a Muslim sixth-grader and her family
challenging ban on headscarves).
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just feel too lazy to put it on one day? Skeptics worry that emphasis on subjective claims
of harm would empower an employee to claim that wearing a baseball hat, say, is as
important to him as wearing a headscarf is to a Muslim woman. I think that fear is
overblown. To raise a triable issue of fact (or to convince a jury) on the existence of a
sincere but subjective claim of injury, the employee would have to offer evidence that he
always wears a hat and that the baseball hat occupies a place in his life that religious head
coverings do in the lives of the devout. There may be some frivolous cases, just as
people occasionally succeed in making frivolous claims as to whether their religion
requires particular dress or practice. But I am not so doubtful of the ability of judges and
jurors to sort these cases out that I am willing to sacrifice the autonomy rights of the
nonreligious to dress in the way that is important to them.
A different fear about using the right of privacy to challenge workplace
appearance codes focuses on the ease with which employers can eliminate expectations
of privacy simply by announcing their intention to intrude upon privacy regularly. Could
Harrah’s, for example, defeat Darlene Jespersen’s privacy claim by asserting that in the
casino industry looks matter and that employees who work in the field should expect
minute attention to their looks, just as they should expect to be videotaped every moment
they are on the gambling floor in order to protect the safety and honesty of the operation?
Here, again, thoughtful analysts of the right of privacy recognize that the law needs to be
reasonable. If an employer can defeat any right of privacy simply by announcing its
intention to allow no privacy, the right is eviscerated, just as the constitutional right of
privacy could in theory be eviscerated by the government’s announcement that
henceforward we’ll all have government-monitored cameras in every room of our homes.
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The expectation of privacy, most agree, is more than a function of whatever the powersthat-be will vouchsafe to us at any given moment.
An additional check on frivolous claims is offered by the requirement that an
expectation of privacy be objectively as well as subjectively reasonable. The objective
element would examine the characteristics of the workplace to try to grasp the
connotations of an appearance requirement to assess whether the reasonable person
would find particular appearance regulation an offensive invasion of autonomy.
Regulation of hair length in the military has different connotations than it does if you
work at the Gap. A buzz cut means something different for men than it does for women,
and would objectively be regarded as humiliating for a woman but not a man.
Established law asks, third, about whether the employer has a good reason for its
requirement. Here privacy analysis has a real advantage over discrimination analysis
because it will enable a more thoughtful (or maybe just more middle-of-the-road)
approach to whether tradition or employer or customer preferences justify a dress code.
If the offense of the dress code is generally small, then tradition is probably sufficient.
Thus, if it’s conventional to wear a suit and tie on Wall Street, there is nothing wrong
with requiring men to wear suits and ties unless the man has some strenuous and good
objection (such as his religion). The armed forces might be able to enforce all of their
uniform requirements, including the picayune ones about which ribbon is worn on which
part of which coat at which time of day, but not, against an Orthodox Jew, the
requirement that men have their heads uncovered indoors or at night.
The strength of the employer’s justification for its appearance requirements
mirrors the function of the BFOQ (in the case of expressly discriminatory dress
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requirements) or the business necessity defense (in the case of dress requirements that are
neutral on their face but have a disparate impact). Take the example of safety. A
requirement that firefighters or airline crew refrain from wearing beards might be
justifiable if it can be proven that in fact a beard prevents the proper fit of an oxygen
mask.35
Fourth, and finally, privacy analysis asks about whether the employer’s asserted
reasons for the appearance requirement could be achieved in some less intrusive manner.
If a uniform is necessary in order to distinguish employees from members of the public,
as in the case of airline flight attendants, is it really necessary that the uniform be sexy?
Would it have to require women to wear skirts? If the symbolism of minute attention to
every detail of military uniforms is necessary to enable people to read each other’s rank
at a glance, it may be permissible to regulate to the nth degree where people wear ribbons
on their uniform. But that same attention to detail may not necessitate that men refrain
from wearing head covering. If that requirement is supported only by tradition, perhaps
that requirement can give way to a particular employee’s strong religious beliefs without
jeopardizing the uniform requirement in all its other minute details.
An important question to consider is the allocation of the burden of proving the
various elements. I propose a divided burden of proof, basing the division on who is
more likely to have access to the necessary evidence. Some elements should surely be on
the employee – the intrusiveness of the regulation, the sincerity and reasonableness of the
employee’s belief that particular dress habits are expressive of her identity and that the
employer’s contrary rule compromises her autonomy in a significant way. Some
elements should probably be upon the employer, such as the justification for the
35

See, e.g., Potter v. District of Columbia, 382 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D.D.C. 2005).
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appearance requirement and the inability to achieve its goals through a less intrusive
policy or the inability to make an exception for a particular employee. For example, even
if one were prepared to uphold the right of the Air Force to prohibit headgear indoors
under most circumstances, exactly what was so compelling about the Air Force’s
requirement that men refrain from wearing head covering that it could not make an
exception for a rabbi? Would it really cause every Air Force officer to insist on wearing
their uniform hats, or baseball hats?
The foregoing is just a sketch of how privacy law might approach workplace
appearance requirements. It suggests that privacy analysis not only enables sincere and
compelling claims of autonomy to be respected, not just those that can be identified as
linked to a particular protected class, but also allows employers to enforce dress codes in
many cases upon a showing of necessity. Unlike current law, it would allow racial
appearance requirements if the employer can prove they’re really necessary (whereas
currently there is no BFOQ for race), while doing a better job than existing law of forcing
employers to justify arbitrary and oppressive appearance requirements even when they do
not discriminate. Let me now turn to a more systematic comparison of a privacy analysis
and the dominant antidiscrimination framework, and also consider some likely objections
to my proposal.

III.

Humiliation Versus Discrimination
A.

Discrimination Analysis of Dress Codes and Its Problems

For the forty years that Title VII has been in force, legal analysis of workplace
dress codes has focused almost exclusively on whether they discriminate on the basis of
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status; gender, race, or religion. Commentators and history have not been kind to the
efforts of courts to decide which social norms of dress are legal and which are not.36 All
of the various approaches that courts have used are either too deferential to employer
preference, on the one hand, or unable to persuade those who think that some employermandated gender difference in attire ought to be legally permissible. Under
antidiscrimination law, a court that believes workplace dress code is acceptable must
either conclude that it does not discriminate or that the discrimination is justified as a
bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) based on the preferences of the employer or
the customers. Neither conclusion seems very appealing to many courts.
First, the per se approach, which held that any employer-mandated gender
difference in appearance was sex discrimination, risks undermining the limits on the
BFOQ defense by allowing stereotypes or employer or customer preference to be enough
to justify discrimination.37 Most commentators, and many courts outside the appearance
regulation area, insist that the BFOQ defense should be very narrowly circumscribed in
order that firms not be allowed to rely on hidden bias, stereotype, or discriminatory
customer attitudes to justify discriminatory practices. Thus, in Johnson Controls, the
leading case on the sex-based BFOQ, the Supreme Court rejected the contention that the
risk of birth defects caused by lead exposure sufficed to justify a rule that prohibited
fertile women from working in battery production. The Court insisted that the BFOQ
defense be construed “narrowly” and be limited to circumstances in which there was

36

See sources cited supra note __.
I owe this typology of different approaches to dress codes to Erica Williamson, whose Note sorted out
the cases and the dominant critiques of them. [cite]

37

Privacy 5

27

3/24/2006

evidence that employees of one sex could not do the job as efficiently as employees of
the other sex.38
Commentators have remarked on the inescapable role of community norms in
deciding when adherence to certain gendered appearance requirements is the “essence” of
a business.39 In an early case involving an older business model of Southwest Airlines, in
which Southwest advertised itself as the “Love Airline,” marketed the sex appeal of its
flight attendants to its target clientele of male business travelers, the court rejected the
contention that the essence of Southwest’s business was selling sex appeal plus safe air
travel, and insisted instead that safe air travel was the business.40 Who is to say whether
the essence of Hooters’ business is selling food or selling sex appeal plus food? Could a
law firm legally say that the essence of the business is to satisfy client preferences,
including, as a lawyer in my early career once described a client’s preference for an
associate who was a “goyisha girl with big charlies”? If a court believes a discriminatory
dress code can be upheld as a BFOQ, it is a bit difficult to understand why the preference
of an employer or its customers for women in make-up or men in neckties should be
honored whereas the preference of an employer or its customers for only young and
handsome employees, or only unmarried employees,41 or only non-Muslim employees, or

38

International Union United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 206 (1991) (BFOQ
requires that the “employer must direct its concerns about a woman's ability to perform her job safely and
efficiently to those aspects of the woman's job-related activities that fall within the "essence" of the
particular business”).
39
See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note __.
40
In both Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (which involved the “Love
Airline” marketing campaign), and Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.
1971) (in which Pan Am justified its refusal to hire male flight attendants with expert psychiatric testimony
that the special psychological needs of passengers in an airplane are better attended to by females), the
courts rejected the contention that the essence of the airline business is selling comfort or sex appeal rather
than merely safe air travel.
41
See, e.g., United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977) (describing the range of litigation
challenging sex discrimination by airlines in hiring flight attendants); Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444
F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971) (declaring the airlines’ no-marriage rule for female flight attendants unlawful).
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only men and infertile women in battery production facility,42 should not be honored.
The alternative to allowing biased employer or customer preferences to govern is to
prohibit any appearance regulation that was not entirely androgynous.
An alternative to the per se rule, with its inevitable struggles over the scope of the
BFOQ, is the mutability analysis, which held that appearance codes are permissible
because they do not discriminate based on immutable characteristics (race, sex, or
national origin). The mutability analysis is vulnerable to the argument that Title VII
prohibits discrimination on mutable traits (religion) and trait-plus discrimination even
when the “plus” is entirely mutable (employer discrimination against women who are
married43 or who have small children44 is illegal, though both of those traits are mutable).
The variation on the mutability rule, that Title VII prohibits discrimination only based on
immutable traits plus fundamental rights (which would protect religion and family status)
still is vulnerable: an employer that hired men only if they can play tennis without
applying the same requirement to women, or that refused to hire women but not men who
bowl, would violate Title VII even though playing tennis and bowling are not generally
regarded as fundamental rights.45
A third approach to discriminatory dress codes is the one employed most recently
in Jespersen: the unequal burdens analysis, which allows appearance codes that equally
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Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187.
Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1198.
44
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971)(per curiam).
45
See id. at 543 (holding that discrimination on the basis of sex plus another trait is illegal). While some
commentators have noted that some of the cases challenging appearance codes have remarked that sex-plus
discrimination is unlawful only if the trait is immutable or a fundamental right, see Yuracko, Trait
Discrimination, supra note __ at 205 & nn.145-47 (collecting citations), there are other cases, including
Price Waterhouse, in which courts have found trait discrimination to be illegal even when the sex-plus trait
is not immutable. I have a hard time believing that a court would uphold an employment rule prohibiting
women but not men from bowling if any employer were silly enough to enforce one.
43

Privacy 5

29

3/24/2006

burden men and women or other comparison groups.46 Its principal flaw is that it invites
silly and utterly subjective comparisons: Is wearing a necktie more or less burdensome
than wearing panty hose? Does it matter whether it is winter or summer? Is shaving
one’s face more or less burdensome than applying make-up and nail polish? What should
a court do about the claim of a particular man who especially loathes a discriminatory
appearance requirement (like shaving or putting on make-up) if most say they don’t
particularly mind it?
The conceptual failings of the dominant forms of discrimination analysis as
applied to dress codes go deeper than the overbreadth or underinclusiveness of the
existing rules. The notion that gendered or ethnic dress codes are illegal only because
they discriminate is, in some cases, artificial. It fails to capture many of the reasons why
employees object to particular appearance regulation. Men in the 1960s did not grow
their hair long in order to look like women, and the offense of making them cut their hair
was not that they were not allowed to wear their hair like women but that they were not
allowed to express the non-gendered message that long hair connoted. Men who wear
long hair aren’t necessarily (or even usually) gender-bending: long hair symbolizes other
things – in the 1960s it signified rebellion against power, convention, and the older
generation; it can signify authentic Native American identity; it can signify earthiness.47
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Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., Inc., 392 F.3d 1076 (2004), reh’g en banc granted, 409 F.3d 1061
(2005).
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I am reminded of the Crosby, Stills Nash (& Young) song, “Almost Cut My Hair,” which celebrates long
hair as a badge of independence:
Almost cut my hair
It happened just the other day
It’s gettin’ kind of long
I could’ve said it was in my way
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The make-up requirement to which Darlene Jespersen objected is more obviously a case
of gender discrimination in that wearing make-up is clearly about feminine sexuality.
But even women who are happy to wear make-up when they choose might be offended
by being forced to wear a certain quantity and to have their compliance checked.
The essentialism of discrimination analysis is its reliance on the idea certain
appearance conventions are “white” or “black” or “male” or whatever. Some whites and
some blacks can wear their hair in an Afro, some of both races cannot. When a court
rejected the claim of a black flight attendant who was fired for wearing her hair in
cornrows by pointing out that the hair style wasn’t “black” because Bo Derek popularized
braids in the movie “10,” the court refused to acknowledge that for that flight attendant,
wearing her hair in cornrows was an important expression of her racial identity, whereas
the same hairstyle on a white woman may connote something entirely different.48
B.

The Advantages of Privacy Analysis

There are several advantages, both practical and doctrinal, for re-examining
workplace dress codes in terms of autonomy-privacy. The advantages fall into two
categories. First, privacy analysis does a better job than discrimination analysis of
balancing competing employer and employee interests by calibrating the strength of the
employer interest in regulating appearance to the degree of autonomy infringement that
regulation causes. Second, privacy is a right that all enjoy, thus the legal protection is
extended to every person because of their individuality, not only to members of those

But I didn’t and I wonder why
I feel like letting my freak flag fly
…
48

Rogers v. American Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair
Piece: Pespectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L. J. 365.
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groups who are protected by antidiscrimination law and who can convince a court that a
dress code treats some groups better than others.
1.

Calibration and Nuance

A legal strategy that focused on discrimination was always vulnerable to the fears
of the extreme argument. To take the argument to its logical conclusion, skeptics
routinely claimed, would prohibit employers from requiring employees to adhere to
conventions for professional dress (men must wear suits and ties; women can and
sometimes must wear suits but not neckties). It would, skeptics insisted, either compel an
employer to employ a drag queen in a customer service position or to require all
employees to dress entirely androgynously so that women would be prohibited from
wearing long hair, make-up, dresses, or high heels if they choose. Both contentions are
often taken as argument-stoppers. Once you concede, as Katharine Bartlett did and I do,
that Title VII should allow some dress codes that reflect community norms while
rejecting others, you have a tough time deciding which norms the law can and should
change or reject and which it should accept.49 Privacy analysis helps, for it reminds
courts and employers that all of us have to conform to some norms of appearance some of
the time, but that no one should be required to conform to every norm all the time
regardless of the harm inflicted or the strength of the justification.
The doctrinal structure of privacy law invites flexibility and nuance in the
examination of the degree to which the policy is offensive (both across the board and as
applied to particular employees), the strength of the justification for a policy that does
invade privacy, and the question whether there are other ways that the employer could
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Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance Standards, Community Norms,
and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2541 (1994).
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achieve its legitimate goals with a lesser infringement on the employee’s autonomy.
Antidiscrimination law, by contrast, makes almost no effort to examine the offensiveness
of a policy and tends to do a poor job at allowing nuance in the question of justification
and fit because of the concern that accepting too many things as a BFOQ will eviscerate
the prohibitions against discrimination.
Moreover, privacy law explicitly incorporates an analysis of justification and
narrow tailoring that antidiscrimination law does only in part. When it comes to race,
because there is no BFOQ for race in Title VII, in theory there is no justification, no
matter how compelling, for an employer to discriminate.50 As to other protected traits,
courts have tried (outside the context of appearance codes and Hooters) to limit the
circumstances in which employer or customer preference counts as a BFOQ to a set of
narrow special categories. When the justification is asserted for a form of disparate
impact discrimination, as in the case of the duty to accommodate religion, the law is far
more forgiving of an employer’s choices that disparately burden people of one religion
over another. Neither in the case of BFOQ nor business necessity have courts been as
thoughtful as one might like about tying the degree of harm to the strength of justification
to the fit between the justification and the policy that inflicts the harm. Privacy analysis,
at its best, insists that courts and lawyers think critically at all three steps.
2.

Privacy for All

One is that privacy doctrine is the one place in employment law where courts
have recognized that there are boundaries to the employer’s ability to regulate the
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workplace in ways that impinge on the employee’s sense or expression of self. Rather
than focusing on equal as opposed to special treatment (is it equality or discrimination to
require all cadets at the Citadel to shave their heads or all Air Force officers to wear no
head covering at certain times?) privacy focuses on the right of employees to have a
sphere, whether it is the contents of their desk, the content of their thoughts, the contents
of their weekend calendar, or the style of their hair that is free from employer control
absent a strong justification.
Second, privacy helps address the conventional complaint that only “favored”
groups are protected by the law. As Kenji Yoshino has pointed out, everyone has to do
some things regarding their appearance that they don’t like – what he calls “covering” –
in order to put on the façade that is expected in different work settings.51 While it is true
that WASP men are protected under Title VII too, and thus on the right facts a white man
could sue to challenge appearance regulation, there is a widespread perception among
whites that people of color, religious minorities, and women have greater workplace
protections because they get to choose whether to acquiesce in a gender- or racestereotyped dress code or whether to fight it. A privacy theory is available to any
employee who can convince a court that some aspect of a dress code is offensive to their
authentic self.
Third, privacy law moves the focus away from antidiscrimination law’s emphasis
on group membership, immutable traits, and group exercise of fundamental rights and
toward the ways in which appearance regulation can harm people because of their
individuality rather than their group membership. By putting the focus on autonomy and
the limits on self-expression at work, the law would extend to all employees a right to
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legal protection for authentic expression as each person feels it. Moreover, privacy
analysis would turn the old antidiscrimination analysis (forced lawyers to argue for the
immutability of identity) on its head. It is the mutability of appearance and the choices
that each person makes about how to express themselves through their appearance that
make workplace dress worthy of legal protection.
Not only does a privacy analysis avoid the fearsome specter of the man
“minc[ing] around in high heels,”52 it also captures an element of dress regulation that is
missing from the conventional analysis. Considering appearance regulations from the
standpoint of antidiscrimination law misses a fundamental part of why employers impose
them, why employees find them objectionable, and why the law should restrict it.
Moreover, prohibiting only those applications of dress codes that discriminate on the
basis of a protected status leaves vulnerable those employees who either do not find or
cannot prove that their objection to a dress code is based on a protected identity
characteristic. Conceiving them as invasions of the autonomy that the right of privacy
protects, however, catches more of the nuance about when and why they should be
prohibited.
C.

Anticipating Objections

Let me now address a number of the objections one might make to my proposal.
First, there is the obvious but facile criticism that a right of privacy seems a poor choice
for protecting something that is as quintessentially public as the public face we set for the
world. A right of privacy is a misnomer, at least in some of its applications in both an
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employment relationship and more obviously in constitutional discourse. It protects all
sorts of behavior that is not necessarily hidden from view; it protects a boundary between
the self and the world, or between one’s personal life and one’s work life. As many have
observed, privacy should be about autonomy, rather than secrecy. Some versions of the
common law right of privacy protect public information (like a photograph of your face)
when the harm to your dignity or autonomy comes not from revelation of private
information but from falsely associating your identity with a product or portraying you in
a false light.53
A more serious objection is that the employee’s autonomy right collides with the
employer’s autonomy right to put its face before the world through the faces of its
employees. This is a point elegantly raised by Robert Post in his work on appearance and
discrimination, Prejudicial Appearances, when he commented on an ordinance that was
proposed (but not ultimately enacted in its most vigorous form) that would have
prevented employers from discriminating based on employee appearance.54 An advocate
of the ordinance described the discrimination she experienced because employers felt
threatened by a woman with a shaved head, save for a single patch of bright pink hair,
and a stripe tattooed on her face. Post observed some inconsistency between the
woman’s awareness and embrace of the shock conveyed by her appearance and her belief
that she should be free from adverse employment action because of the reactions her
looks elicit. He remarked on “the seemingly paradoxical notion that persons have the
right both to use their appearance to communicate meanings, including messages of
53
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‘threat,’ and simultaneously expect others to ignore these messages.”55 A resolution of
the paradox, if there is a paradox, can be reached if we use law to force people to
confront exactly what meaning is conveyed by a sales clerk with a shaved head, a lawyer
with blue hair, or a cross-dressing insurance agent.
There are two parts to the analysis. First, there is the idea that firms have a right
to express themselves through their employee’s appearance. The heart of the opposition
to appearance regulation is the idea that it deprives the employer of its autonomy right to
to express itself through the faces of the people it hires. I question whether employers,
even when they are individuals, and even when the job in question has an important
component of conveying certain values, have a right to express themselves through their
employees regardless of the message. Take the extreme case of employer autonomy:
where I am hiring a nanny to care for my children. Why should I be able to require her to
wear a uniform, if the message conveyed by domestic staff wearing a uniform is one of
subordination (as I think it is)? Why should the owner of a spa be able to require “badly
coiffed employees” to get their hair cut?56 What message is conveyed by an employee of
a spa having a hair cut that the spa owner doesn’t like?
Whatever the force of the employer autonomy argument when the employer is an
individual or a small business, when the business can be seen to express the individuality
of the person who owns it, I question whether a corporation has a similar right. Courts
have been reluctant to extend to corporations the same panoply of associational and
expressive rights that individuals enjoy, recognizing that the expression of corporate
expression or association rights comes at the expense of employees’ rights to be free from
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discrimination.57 Whose expression are we protecting? The managers, executives, or
stockholders of corporations? In what sense do the shareholders of Harrah’s casinos
express themselves through the bartender in Reno? The argument usually gains traction
only when it is taken to an extreme in one direction or another. A fashion industry
executive who suggested an employee get a pedicure before wearing a pair of sandals to
an industry gala would defend her position by saying that in her industry people are
judged on their looks, and that even a single employee whose feet might prompt someone
else in the industry to think the employee was unattractive could somehow adversely
affect the reputation of the firm.58
Even if you assert that corporations should have a right of expression in this
context, as they have a right to engage in first amendment speech,59 one might still
question whether a corporation’s right to express itself through employee appearance that
is sufficiently compelling to trump an employee’s right to express herself. In the first
amendment context, the expressive interests of associations is generally limited to those
associations (whose ranks may have grown after the Supreme Court upheld the right of
the Boy Scouts to express a homophobic message by the exclusion of gays) that can
credibly claim to be sufficiently private and sufficiently devoted to expression that it
would violate the rights of the members to join together with those who share their views
and to exclude those who do not. It is a huge leap to move from a private organization’s
expressive interests in excluding gays to the right of large corporations to express
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themselves in their hiring decisions; if you make that move, of course, all of
contemporary antidiscrimination law is constitutionally suspect.60
Second, even if you accept the notion that firms have some legally protectable
right to express themselves through their employees’ appearance, you have to ask what
message is conveyed by a firm that employs a person with unconventional or shocking
(to some) appearance? Consider tattoos and headscarves as examples.
Tattoos. The meaning of tattoos appears to be undergoing a significant transition
in the contemporary U.S. Once considered the favored adornment of sailors of the lowest
rank, and later regarded the insignia of renegade motorcyclists and gang members, tattoos
are now said to be widely accepted among the younger generation. A 2003 Harris online
interactive poll, as reported in a Nevada newspaper, found that thirty-six percent of
people between the ages of 25 and 29 have at least one tattoo, as compared to a quarter of
those in their 30s.61 The news article portrayed the perception of tattoos as being very
generationally specific: younger people think nothing of them; older people find them
slovenly, repulsive, or even intimidating. If the justification for allowing employers to
prohibit tattoos is customer reaction (though it is not always that; some even argue that
employers can inquire about and refuse to hire based on tattoos that are not visible when
the employee is clothed62), what weight should we give to the possibility that the
employer is misjudging customer reaction? The growing popularity of tattoos suggests
that their meaning is changing. The employer’s message in banning them may be
muddier than it once was, which should reduce the weight of whatever interest the
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employer has in regulating that aspect of employee self-expression. If tattoos are no
longer a reliable predictor of a bad attitude toward authority or toward work, it is hard to
imagine any legitimate employer interest in refusing to hire employees with tattoos that
are not visible while the employee is clothed.
Headscarves. The furor over French legislation banning headscarves in schools
raised the question whether the ban was about preserving a secular society, protecting
girls against repressive religious demands, or repressing Muslim identity. A careful
student of the debate over the legislation could find a mix of these motives in the ban.63
The wearing of the headscarf itself could reflect the wearer’s attempt to convey one or
more of multiple messages, including religious piety, gender subordination, or ethnic
pride. You could see in the Muslim women who insist on headscarves a desire to
embrace an ethnic heritage or pride that becomes all the more fierce as they perceive a
rising tide of anti-immigrant sentiment among non-Muslim French. You could see a
desire to find the comfort of ethnic identity as an antidote to the alienation and anomie of
persistent poverty in the grim housing projects outside Paris. And of course the
interpretation of the headscarf by viewers could vary as well. What some French may
once have deemed a relatively innocuous or charming ethnic or religious tradition might
now be regarded as an endorsement of separatism, chauvinism, or even anti-European
violence. In short, you cannot understand the multiple messages both implied by women
who wear headscarves and inferred by people who view them without understanding the
social and political context of the Muslim and African immigrant population in France.
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But the fact that you need to understand the context of group identity in order to
grasp the multiple meanings of certain habits of dress does not mean that they would
become unintelligible if we supplemented the dominant antidiscrimination analysis with a
privacy analysis. My point, rather, is that we’ll need some understanding of the groupbased identity formation that people engage in when they make choices about their
appearance in order to understand why some appearance regulations are permissible and
others are not. The messages conveyed by habits of dress and personal adornment are
varied, extremely context specific, and change rapidly. The wearer, the employer, and
the customer may be conveying and receiving quite different messages. Awareness of
the group-based identity formation that dress performs, an awareness of the equality
issues implicated in appearance regulation strengthens rather than weakens the claim for
privacy protection. In particular, given the muddiness in the signal, but the undeniable
hardship on an employee who is fired or not hired because of her appearance, it seems to
me that the employer’s argument for self-expression through employees’ bodies is
weaker than the employees’ arguments.
Another objection to my proposal goes to the question whether, if we divorce the
legal analysis of appearance regulation from antidiscrimination analysis, we will lose our
understanding of why appearance regulation matters. Every observer of appearance
regulation, at least since Erving Goffman’s influential (and newly resurgent) book
Stigma, has noted that appearances are meaningful because they enable both the viewer
and the viewed establish a social identity by association with a category. Today’s
favorite citation for that same observation is Malcolm Gladwell’s bestselling work, Blink,
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which documents the importance of snap judgments formed on first impressions.64 That
is, appearances identify us as members of a group, and they are meaningful only in the
context of particular cultures. A headscarf can be religious (on a nun or a Muslim
woman), ethnic (on a person expressing Caribbean identity or heritage), or glamorous (on
a Hollywood movie star riding in a convertible in the 1950s). Lots of gold jewelry can be
“ghetto fabulous” on a black person,65 or a traditional display of wealth and status in
India, or glamorous on the wife of a Texas oil magnate shopping in Beverly Hills, or
trashy among certain New England old money sorts who disdain conspicuous displays of
wealth. The importance of appearance as an expression of self is meaningful only in the
context in which appearance says something about you (or at least you think it does), and
that has necessarily something to do with group identity.
I think that reconceiving workplace appearance regulation in terms of privacy will
not sacrifice the group identity based understanding of why appearances matter and why
protecting employees’ rights to choose appearance is important in the ongoing project of
eliminating racial, gender, and other forms of subordination. It will strengthen the project
by forcing us to recognize that appearance rules that do not discriminate on the basis of a
protected class (like tattoos or green hair) nevertheless subordinate an out group and do
so in a way that is often unjustified by business necessity and based largely on ill-
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considered stereotype. It turns out, as a Nevada employer remarked, that “[y]ounger
folks are into body art, and have a good work ethic.”66
Conclusion
I have argued that we should reconceive the legality of workplace dress codes in
terms of the universal protections for liberty and autonomy that are protected by the right
of privacy rather than, as we have done, through group-based equality doctrine. My
proposal does not require a break with past law but rather simply a shift in emphasis.
That is, using the formulation of Carbado, Gulati, and Ramachandran, that appearance
requirements are “a kind of forced assimilation into gender normative behavior,” I simply
suggest we focus more than we have on the forced assimilation part as opposed to the
gender normativity part.
A casual reader of the legal literature on appearance regulation might come away
with the vague impression either that people who write on the topic are especially literary
in their tastes or that there is some deep connection between novels and the law of
appearances. The truth of the matter is that novelists have, because of the constraints of
their task, learned something that lawyers have not: appearances matter because of what
they reveal about interiors. A lawyer or judge arguing that workplace appearance
regulation is inoffensive or trivial operates from that old notion (especially popular with
parents trying to console an adolescent insecure about his or her looks or to counsel
someone making an unwise choice in love) that looks are only skin deep. A novelist
would never say that; the description of a character’s appearance in a novels is rarely just
about the surface; it is about revelation of a character’s personality, history, motivations,
and future.
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So too in life. The way people choose to dress and other aspects of their
appearance are deliberate choices for most people. Those who dress to blend into a Wall
Street culture do so because that’s how they see themselves in the world, or feel
themselves in the world. Those who choose to dye their hair green do so because they
want to be noticed by those without green hair (and to blend in among the green hair
crowd). The way we choose to dress, and it is always an ongoing process of choice, is
part of everyone’s process of self-definition. Whatever someone’s choice, to require him
or her to dress in a way that feels fundamentally contrary to his or her preferences is to
ask him or her to project an inauthentic self. Regardless of whether you can identify your
self-definition with a group currently protected under antidiscrimination law, the right to
define your self is at the very core of what the right of privacy should protect.
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